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The global financial crisis has uncovered a number of 
weaknesses in the supervision and regulation of cross 
border banks. One such weakness was the lack of effective 
cooperation among banking supervisors. Since then, 
international bodies, such as the G-20, the Financial 
Stability Board and the Basel Committee have actively 
promoted the use of supervisory colleges. The objective 
of this paper is to explore the obstacles to effective cross 
border supervisory information sharing. More specifically, 
a schematic presentation illustrating the misalignments 
in incentives for information sharing between home 
and host supervisors under the current supervisory task-
sharing anchored in the Basel Concordat is developed. 
This paper finds that in the absence of an ex ante agreed 
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upon resolution and burden-sharing mechanism and 
deteriorating health of the bank, incentive conflicts 
escalate and supervisory cooperation breaks down. 
The promotion of good practices for cooperation in 
supervisory colleges is thus not sufficient to address the 
existing incentive conflicts. What is needed is a rigorous 
analysis and review of the supervisory task-sharing 
framework, so that the right incentives are secured during 
all stages of the supervisory process. For this purpose, it is 
essential that policy makers integrate and harmonize the 
current debates on crisis management, resolution policy 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis has uncovered a number of weaknesses in the supervision and regulation of 
cross  border  banks
1.  One  such  weakness  was  the  lack  of  effective  cooperation  among  banking 
supervisors. Since then, international bodies such as the G 20, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel Committee)  have responded in a concerted effort 
and publicly promoted the use of supervisory colleges
2. Under the oversight of the FSB, supervisory 
colleges for each of the largest global financial institutions  have now been  established
3 and high level 
principles for good practices in supervisory colleges have been released (Basel Committee, 2010).  
 
Despite the renewed attention, supervisory colleges have been in place for a long time. Indeed, the first 
supervisory colleges date back to the 1980s,   and  they  became more widespread during the Basel II 
implementation. In the recent literature analyzing the causes and consequences of the financial crisis, little 
evidence of the effectiveness of global supervisory colleges in identifying, preventing or handling the fall- 
out of the financial crisis at an institutional level has emerged. The Basel Committee performed a survey 
in the su mmer of 2009   on the operations of supervisory colleges ,  but the results remain   largely 
confidential.  
 
So,  how is it possible that   supervisory colleges  have  entered  into  the spotlight  again  without  their 
effectiveness being adequately and comprehensively assessed? What are the safeguards that have been 
put in place so that colleges will work more effectively next time around? Can they actually be effective 
in the absence of a bank resolution mechanism and/or an ex ante agreed upon burden-sharing mechanism? 
More  fundamentally, is  the current supervisory  task-sharing  between  home  and host  supervisor  still 
aligned  with  today’s  global  financial  landscape?  Does  it  not  unduly  disadvantage  host  supervisors? 
Finally, does the supervisory task-sharing provide the right incentives for cooperation among supervisors 
during all stages of the supervisory process? 
 
The objective of this paper is to identify the instances where misalignments in incentives between home 
and host supervisors occur and to analyze policy options to address them.  These distortions in incentives 
can lead to manipulation of judgmental supervisory information, delays in the sharing of information 
between home and host supervisors and ring-fencing
4. They can have systemic impact, particularly for 
host supervisors whose financial systems are dominated by foreign banks.  
 
The  application  of  the  principal-agent  theory  provides  the  theoretical  framework  to  identify  the 
information asymmetry problems that result in self capture, industry capture and political capture of the 
supervisor at the domestic level. The analysis is then extended to the cross border context , taking into 
                                                           
1 This paper focuses on prudential banking supervision in an international context. Consumer protection, other aspects of 
regulation and supervisory arrangements in the European Union (EU) lie outside of the scope of this paper.  
2 Supervisory colleges are groups of supervisors with the primary objective of exchanging information and establishing a 
dialogue in order to ensure that they are able to identify and address the main risks across a banking group. More information on 
supervisory colleges is provided in Section 5 of this paper.  
3 FSB (2010 d, p 17 section VII.5) 
4 Ring-fencing can be defined as an action or regulation by a host supervisor to protect domestic assets of a bank so that they can 
be seized and liquidated under the local law in case of failure of the parent. Ring-fencing can take various forms, can occur at 
various stages of the supervision process and can be applied at the level of the institution and at the level of the overall banking 
system.. 2 
 
account the fact that cross border externalities are commonly ignored by banking supervisors.  This paper 
finds that these domestic "capture" problems are exacerbated in a cross border context and together with 
the observed disregard of cross border externalities, they lead to a further weakening in the incentives to 
cooperate.  
   
At an institutional level, the geographic risk profile as well as the health  of the banking group will 
influence the intensity of the conflicts of interest between home and host supervisors. Indeed, the two 
main drivers for the home and host supervisor’s incentives to share information are; the materiality of the 
host’s operations to the banking group and the systemic nature of the foreign operations in the host 
jurisdiction,  respectively.  This  paper  illustrates  this  point  by  presenting  a  schematic  presentation  of 
incentive conflicts between home and host supervisors. In a setting with a home and a host supervisor of a 
systemic  banking  group  with  integrated  functions  such  as  funding  and  liquidity,  three  scenarios  are 
analyzed; first the case of ongoing preventative supervision; second, the deteriorating health of the parent 
bank and third, the deteriorating health of the subsidiary. In the preventative stage, there are only a limited 
number  of  instances  where  both  home  and  host  supervisors  have  strong  incentives  to  openly  share 
accurate and timely information.  This paper demonstrates that as the health of the parent deteriorates, the 
home supervisor will have an incentive to delay the sharing of information or minimize the seriousness of 
the situation. The host supervisor on the other hand will have an incentive to apply ring-fencing measures 
in  its  jurisdiction.  Sudden  ring-fencing  decisions  have  the  potential  to  further  increase  stress  on  the 
banking group's legal entities in other jurisdictions and on the banking group. As a result, in some cases, 
supervisory  information  sharing  in  a  supervisory  college  and  consequent  early  remedial  action  may 
actually  increase  the  probability  of  further  distress  in  the  banking  group  and  complicate  crisis 
management.  Similarly,  in  those  cases  in  which  the  health  of  the  subsidiary  deteriorates,  the  host 
supervisor has an incentive to overstate the problems, particularly if the operations are systemic in the 
host jurisdiction.  
 
One would expect that policies and practices have been designed to take into account these specific 
findings. In reality, little has changed since the crisis. The current supervisory arrangements for cross 
border supervision do not address these inherent incentive distortions. Considering the leading role of the 
home  supervisor,  in  the  absence  of  mediation  or  conflict  resolution  mechanisms  and  accountability 
arrangements for home supervisors outside their home jurisdiction, the host supervisor finds itself at a 
disadvantage.  Additionally, since the crisis, most of the cross border policy efforts have been directed 
towards crisis and resolution measures with limited consideration of their inter-linkages with preventative 
supervisory cooperation.   
 
Without any mechanisms to induce, or even force, supervisors to cooperate in spite of their respective 
domestic mandates, supervisory colleges cannot be effective for all banking groups.  Additionally, in the 
absence of an international resolution mechanism and an ex ante burden-sharing mechanism, supervisory 
cooperation is very likely to break down again as the health of the financial institution deteriorates.  It is 
therefore crucial that policy makers do not divorce the crisis management and resolution policy debate 
from the discussion about good supervisory practices in cross border supervision. The development of 




This  study  is  written  from  the  perspective  of  the  host  supervisor  and  is  divided  into  six  parts.  The 
following section explains the experience with the current supervisory task-sharing between home and 
host supervisors during the financial crisis. Section 3 describes the challenges and incentive problems in 
cross border banking supervision. A schematic presentation of information sharing incentives for home 
and the host supervisor under three scenarios (preventative supervision, deteriorating health of the parent 
and deteriorating health of the subsidiary) is developed in Section 4.  Section 5 explores policy options to 
address the misalignments in incentives identified. The final section concludes. 
 
 
II.  Supervisory  Arrangements  for  Cross  Border  Banking  Supervision  and  Experience 
during the Global Financial Crisis 
 
1.  Supervisory Arrangements for Cross Border Banking Supervision 
 
Arrangements  for  cross  border  supervision  are  described  in  the  2006  "Core  Principles  for  Effective 
Banking Supervision
5”. The Core Principles reflect an international consensus regarding good practices in 
banking supervision and were intended to facilitate convergence in supervisory frameworks. The Core 
Principles establish the fundamental requirement for supervision on a group wide basis. Core Principle 24 
states that “[a]n essential element of banking supervision is that supervisors supervise the banking group 
on a consolidated basis, adequately monitoring and, as appropriate, applying prudential norms to all 
aspects of the business conducted by the group worldwide.” Core Principle 25 declares that “[c]ross-
border  consolidated  supervision  requires  cooperation  and  information  exchange  between  home 
supervisors  and  the  various  other  supervisors  involved,  primarily  host  banking  supervisors.  Banking 
supervisors must require the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same standards as 
those required of domestic institutions. “ 
 
 In  essence,  home  country  supervisors  are  responsible  for  consolidated  supervision  and  host  country 
supervisors  are  responsible  for  supervision  on  an  individual  or  sub  consolidated  basis  for  entities 
operating in their country (see Box 1). Also, responsibility for the supervision of a branch with respect to 
solvency lies primarily with the home supervisor. On the other hand, the responsibility with respect to the 
supervision  of  liquidity  on  the  other  hand  usually  resides  with  the  host  supervisor.  To  exercise 
consolidated supervision of a cross border financial group, the home supervisor thus must cooperate with 
its counterparts in other jurisdictions to help ensure the safety and soundness of the group concerned. The 
Core Principles also require that the home supervisor inform the host of any significant problems that 
arise  in  the  parent  or  head  office.  In  practice,  this  cooperation  has  mainly  been  supported  by  the 
establishment of non binding memoranda of understanding (MOU) and supervisory colleges between 
home and host supervisors.  
 
                                                           
5 Basel Committee (2006b).The Basel Committee has announced that the Core Principles will be updated to take into account the 
lessons learnt and new regulations issued since the global financial crisis (Wellink, 2011). The Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
has made specific recommendations for this review in its report on “Intensity and Effectiveness of SIFI Supervision” issued in 
November 2010 (FSB 2010b). 4 
 
Importantly, the division of supervisory responsibilities between different countries is not necessarily 
consistent with the division of responsibilities relating to crisis management and resolution, including the 
provision of the lender of last resort function. 
Box 1: An Historical Perspective on the Efforts of the Basel Committee on Cross Border 
Supervision 
The efforts of the Committee in the area of cooperation among supervisors in cross border supervision go back to 
1975 with the publication of the “Concordat” or the “Report on the Supervision of Bank’s Foreign Establishments” 
(Basel Committee 1975). In May 1983 the “Principles for the Supervision of Bank’s Foreign Establishments” (Basel 
Committee 1983) replaced the “Concordat” and reformulated some of its provisions, particularly to take account of 
the subsequent acceptance of the principle that banking supervisory authorities cannot be fully satisfied about the 
soundness  of  individual  banks  unless  they  can  examine  the  totality  of  each  bank's  business  worldwide  on  a 
consolidated basis.  In 1992, the “Minimum Standards for the Supervision of International Banking Groups and 
their Cross-Border Establishments” (Basel Committee 1992) were released so as to define more clearly how the 
1983 update of the “Concordat” was to be implemented in practice. Two basic principles have governed the Basel 
Committee’s efforts. First, no foreign banking establishment should escape supervision. Second, the supervision of 
the foreign establishment should be adequate. Hence, the home supervisors as well as the host supervisor should 
explicitly approve the establishment abroad. In 1996, another report on “Supervision of Cross Border Banking” was 
released by the Basel Committee. This report lists a number of recommendations aimed at removing obstacles to the 
implementation  of  effective  consolidated  supervision.  The  cross  border  supervisory  framework  of  the  Basel 
Committee  was  further  reinforced  in  May  2001  with  the  release  of  “Essential  Elements  of  a  Statement  of 
Cooperation between Banking Supervisors” (Basel Committee 2001). This publication sets out essential elements in 
the areas of sharing information, onsite inspections, protection of information, and ongoing coordination.  
 
Basel II stressed the need for cooperation among supervisors because it is applied at each level of the banking group, 
so that there is a technical requirement on the part of both home country and host country supervisors to provide a 
Pillar 1 and Pillar 2
1 assessment.  In 2003, the Basel Committee released the “High-Level Principles for the Cross 
Border  Implementation  of  the  New  Accord”  (Basel  Committee  2003).  This  document  does  not  change  the 
assignment of supervisory responsibility of the “Concordat” but it complements it by introducing six principles 
specifically related to Basel II implementation. These six principles cover the following areas  
1. The lack of change in the current supervisory task-sharing; 
2. The responsibility of the home supervisor; 
3. The specific requirements of host supervisors; 
4. The enhanced and pragmatic coordination led by the home supervisor;  
5. The avoidance of redundant and uncoordinated approval and validation work; 
6. The communication with the relevant bank. 
In  2006,  these  principles  were  strengthened  by  “Home  Host  Information  Sharing  for  Effective  Basel  II 
Implementation”  (Basel  Committee  2006a),  a  report  that  focuses  on  information  sharing  processes  specifically 
related to Basel II. This report provides guidance as well as specific examples of information that host supervisors 
might need to refer to for sound Basel II implementation.  
1  The  Basel  II  Framework  consists  of  three  mutually  reinforcing  pillars.  Pillar  1  sets  out  the  revised  minimum  capital 
requirements that will be based on a charge for each of the main risk types (credit risk, market risk and operational risk). Pillar 2 
establishes international guidelines for the supervisory review process that complement the Pillar 1 minimum requirements. In 
effect, this is an acknowledgment that the capital calculations under Pillar 1 will never fully capture the risk profile of individual 
institutions, and that supervisors must therefore use their supervisory process to address this shortcoming. Pillar 3 represents a 
range of increased disclosure requirements. 
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2.  Experience with the Current Supervisory Arrangements during the Global Financial Crisis 
 
The financial crisis has illustrated the boundaries of international supervisory cooperation by showing that 
national interests become crucial when the supervised institution enters into serious difficulty and must be 
resolved.  Indeed,  effective  home  and  host  cooperation  was  virtually  absent  in  the  resolution  of  the 
Lehman Brothers subsidiaries outside of the United States. The holding company filed for bankruptcy and 
Lehman’s  broker  dealer  operations  were  merged  with  Barclays  Capital.  This  created  chaos  abroad, 
particularly  in  the  United  Kingdom  where  Lehman’s  subsidiaries  also  had  to  file  for  bankruptcy. 
Likewise, many savers in the EU deposited their money with Icelandic banks. In violation of agreements 
of  the  European  Economic  Area  (EAA)
6,  Iceland protected only Icelandic deposito rs  and failed to 
cooperate with foreign supervisory and resolution authorities. Many host countries paid their domestic 
savers for political reasons, outside of multilateral agreements for deposit protection.  
 
From the perspective of the host supervisor, there are six fundamental reasons explaining the lack of 
effective cooperation. 
 
The first, and most recognized reason, is the focus of the current supervisory arrangements on ongoing 
supervision and the lack of an effective mechanism to resolve failing financial institutions that are active 
in multiple jurisdictions.
7 An effective resolution regime should be able to minimize the systemic damage 
caused by an orderly collapse without exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss. To do this, the regime 
must provide authorities with the tools to safely and quickly ensure the continued performance of the 
bank’s essential functions, including uninterrupted access of depositors to their funds wherever they are 
located, and to transfer and sell viable portions of the bank. The current sector specific and nationally 
based resolution regimes are fragmented and at odds with the way in which internationally active banks 
and conglomerates operate. Institutions and markets have evolved, but the harmonization of frameworks 
for resolving internationally active financial institutions has not kept pace.  
 
Second, the implementation of the current supervisory arrangements for cross border supervision favors 
home country supervisors by giving them a leading role. In some particular scenarios, host countries of 
systemically relevant foreign institutions with integrated cross border funding and liquidity functions or 
countries where large parts of the financial system are owned by international banking groups remain 
subject to the goodwill of the home supervisor to provide timely, accurate and comprehensive information 
on  the  financial  condition  of  the  banking  group.  Pistor  (2010)  argues  that  the  Basel  Concordat  is 
primarily concerned with risks emanating from a host country’s failure to properly supervise a subsidiary 
to the parent company and its home supervisor. Pistor states that the Concordat does not address the now 
common opposite scenario where host countries are exposed to supervisory failure by the home country. 
Her findings are confirmed and illustrated in section 4 of this paper. 
 
                                                           
6 The European Economic Area was established on 1 January 1994 following an agreement between the member states of the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Union. Specifically, it allows Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway to 
participate in the EU internal market without a conventional EU membership. In exchange, they are obliged to adopt all EU 
legislation related to the single market, except laws on agriculture and fisheries. 
7 An ex-ante burden sharing mechanism is also not in place. This is basically a credible pre-commitment between countries to 
address a cross-border bank failure where countries agree in advance to share the financial burden of a rescue when the systemic 
impact of the failure would exceed the cost of recapitalization.   6 
 
Third, the current supervisory arrangements for cross border supervision do not address the inherent flaws 
in structural incentives between home and host supervisors. More specifically, there are no mechanisms to 
persuade individual or groups of regulators to cooperate in accordance with their assigned cross border 
supervisory responsibility. Assembling home and host supervisors in a supervisory college with a good 
practice guide is not enough to make them partners with the common objective of effective cross border 
banking supervision.  
 
Fourth,  and  closely  linked  to  the  previous  observation,  is  the  lack  of  accountability  or  sanctions  if 
supervisory cooperation does not take place or is not in accordance with good practice. There are credible 
accountability arrangements at the domestic level for many individual supervisory authorities, but when 
their supervisory actions or decisions have a cross border impact, these effects are simply not taken into 
account. There are, however, some mechanisms to provide external monitoring of domestic regulatory 
and supervisory frameworks. Examples include the Basel Core Principles (BCP) assessments performed 
by  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the  World  Bank  as  a  stand-alone  “Report  on  the 
Observance of Standards and Codes” (ROSC) or as part of the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
(FSAP).  Under  the  BCP  assessments,  external  experts  assess  compliance  with  the  25  Basel  Core 
Principles by regulatory agencies in countries worldwide, with the objective of evaluating the quality of 
regulatory  and  supervisory  frameworks.  Additionally,  the  recently  established  “peer”  reviews  by  the 
Financial Stability Board could relatively easily be used in this area (FSB 2010a). The FSB member 
jurisdictions have committed to undergo both thematic and country peer reviews. That said, the devil is in 
the detail of information sharing and it remains to be seen if enough time and resources will be committed 
to these initiatives to ensure adequate scope and depth in the assessments of cross border supervision 
practices.  
 
Fifth, the absence of a mediation and/or conflict resolution mechanism combined with the leading role for 
the  home  supervisor leaves  host supervisors  with  no  bargaining  power  and nobody  to  turn  to  when 
disagreements arise. There are no mechanisms to resolve conflicts other than by negotiation and mutual 
cooperation with the home supervisor.  
 
Sixth, policy makers have not yet addressed the interactions between the five fundamental shortcomings 
above. For example, the absence of an international resolution regime and an ex ante burden-sharing 
mechanism has the potential to hamper supervisory cooperation  of international financial institutions 
(Rosgeren 2007; Claessens, Herring and Schoenmaker 2010). While the current supervisory cooperation 
model led by the home supervisor could be effective as long as the banking group performs well, the 
dominant national interests have the potential to lead to a quick dry up of information flows or outright 
misreporting as the health of the banking group deteriorates and resolution becomes more probable.  
 
A simple example will clarify. Consider an integrated banking group with centralized liquidity, capital 
and funding management, facing serious liquidity problems in the home country. If the home supervisor 
informs the host supervisor of the threat, the latter will want to protect his local depositors from the 
problems of the parent. The emergency measures taken by authorities in one host country, commonly 
referred to as ring-fencing measures, will then increase stress on the banking group's legal entities in other 
jurisdictions and on the banking group as a whole. Hence, in some cases, early remedial action and 
supervisory information sharing may increase the probability of further distress and complicate crisis 7 
 
management.  Working  backward,  this  scenario  demonstrates  that  the  absence  of  an  ex  ante  clear 
resolution and burden-sharing mechanism incites the host supervisor to take immediate action and hence 
can impede the effectiveness of preventative cross border supervision.  
 
The  objective  of  supervisory  task-sharing  arrangements  should  be  that  supervisors  of  internationally 
active cross border banks work closely together as partners to achieve effectively supervised cross border 
banking groups. Hence, supervisory arrangements and practices should be tailored to ensure that conflicts 
of interest resulting from distortions in incentives are properly addressed.  The next section explores the 
rather wide range of existing challenges and incentive problems in the supervision of cross border banks. 
  
 
III.  Incentive Problems in Domestic and Cross Border Banking Supervision  
 
To analyze challenges and incentive problems in cross border banking supervision, two topics in the 
existing literature will be reviewed.  The first deals with incentive problems in banking supervision, 
generally analyzed in a single country setting.  The second deals with cross border externalities.   
 
1.  Single Country Setting 
 
The principal-agent framework is widely used in the literature to explain the incentive conflicts resulting 
in regulatory failure
8. In the principal-agent model, a task is delegated by the principal to the agent.  For 
banking supervision,  Dijkstra (2010) described  and portrayed  the various principal-agent relationships 
that can be identified resulting in the regulator playing the role of both agent and principal (figure 1). 
First, the tax payers or society can be seen as the main principal. Individual members deal with financial 
institutions and have the task of supervising their actions. However, they lack the time and particularly the 
expertise to monitor their financial institution counterparts adequately and comprehensively. This task is 
therefore delegated to the government, making  the latter the agent of the tax payers . The government 
itself then frequently delegates the task to a specialized agency.  That agency becomes the agent of both 
society and the government. To achieve its objectives, the agency will then impose prudential regulation 












                                                           
8  See Kane (1989a) and Kane (1989b). Kane(1990) analyzes the principal-agent problems in the resolution of the Savings & 
Loans crisis in the US. Kane (1997) suggests various measures to align public and private incentives. In Kane (2002) a scheme of 




Figure 1: Principal-Agent Relation in Banking Supervision  
 
Source:  Dijkstra 2010, p 118. 
 
A contract aligning the incentives of the agent to those of the principal should be in place (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In practice, this contract should be characterized by clear objectives of the supervisory 
agencies, generally outlined in laws, and by the accountability of the agency to politicians, who are 
elected by the principals.    
 
However, the delegation of the task to the government and then to the agency will inherently lead to 
information  asymmetry
9.  In  most  circumstances,  market  participants  find  ways  to  mitigate  this 
information  asymmetry:  for example  the principal  can monitor  the agent.  In the case of prudential 
supervision, the task may well be too complex to be monitored effectively by the principal.   This 
complexity arises from the very specialized skills as well as vast amounts of data necessary to  conduct 
banking supervision.  Additionally, clear objectives for supervisory agencies are hard to define as 
prudential regulation should not, and cannot, guarantee a zero failure rate. Many confidentiality concerns 
also arise  for prudential supervisors whe n dealing with individual banks. As a result  of information 
asymmetry, confidentiality and complexity,  agents have quite a bit of  discretion to follow their own  
interests or goals other than the interest of the principal (figure 2). The question then to be raised is:  Are 
there any conflicting goals between society, government , and prudential supervisors? Intuitively, one 








                                                           
9 For example, most relevant information is known only to the supervisory agency. Prudential supervisors receive confidential 
and propriety information from supervised institutions which they do not share with the government. This creates information 






Dijkstra  (2010)  finds  that  politicians  and  bureaucrats  do  not  necessarily  follow  the  national  interest 
because each will act in an opportunistic way to maximize his or her own economic benefits such as 
salary, public reputation and power.  Shueler (2003) describes this notion as "bureaucratic self capture", 
meaning that regulators will act to protect their own careers or reputation for example by disguising poor 
performance by their agency (see also Goodhardt 1996; Mishkin 2001).  
 
They will also act in favor of persons who have the potential to strongly influence their careers - namely 
banks,  or  politicians  or  both.  The  result  can  be  industry  capture  and  political  capture,  respectively. 
Industry capture happens when regulators act in the interest of their domestic commercial banks and 
promote the interests of the financial industry over those of the public. Political capture is the promotion 
of  the  interests  of  politicians  by  regulators.  A  recent  example  was  the  clear  interest  of  the  U.S. 
government, and hence regulators, to support and maintain securitization to provide credit to the less 
credit worthy. Another example is the pressure on regulators by governments not to close a bank as bank 
closures are particularly unpopular with the bank customers and always come at a cost. Industry and 
political capture can materialize in exercising regulatory forbearance, poor supervisory and enforcement 
practices and lax regulations. (Buiter 2008) 
 
In summary, in a single-country setting, information asymmetries can cause opportunistic behavior, such 
as self-capture, political capture, and/or industry capture. The result can be regulatory forbearance, lax 
regulations and macro policies driven by politicians.  
 
2.  Multiple Country Setting 
The additional cross border dimension of the principal-agent problem crystallizes in the fact that national 
regulatory authorities do not take cross border externalities into account. Much of the literature in this 
regard focuses on  the European Union,  but the conclusions remain  equally valid in the international 
context.  Stolz  (2002)  reviews  the  optimal  design  of  banking  supervision  when  there  is  cross  border 
lending. She demonstrates that supervisors who are accountable only to their own jurisdiction will not 
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take cross border effects into account. Shuler (2003) incorporates the externality problem into a principal-
agent framework thereby focusing on the conflict of interest between taxpayers as principals and the bank 
supervisors  as  agents  in  the  EU.  The  vertical  dimension  focuses  on  the  "traditional"  principal-agent 
relationship in  a  particular  jurisdiction.  In  addition, Schueler  describes  an  international  or  horizontal 
dimension including the disregard by national prudential supervisors of negative externalities in another 
country affecting other banks or the economy in general from the failure of a bank (figure 3). 
 
Figure 3 : Incentive Problems in Cross Border Banking Supervision 
 
Source: Schueler 2003, p. 9 
 
Typically, the objectives of a supervisory agency will include safeguarding and protecting the domestic 
financial system and minimizing the fiscal cost of recapitalization or insolvency to domestic taxpayers. 
Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2005) also find that national authorities in a European Union context will 
take into account only those externalities in their own jurisdiction and will ignore externalities in a cross 
border context.   
 
As an illustration, Claessens, Herring and Schoenmaker (2010) have described this conflict in incentives, 
and ultimately accountability, in more general terms as the “financial trilemma” involving the three policy 
objectives  -  preserving  national  resolution  authority,  fostering  cross-border  financial  integration  and 
maintaining global financial stability – cannot be attained (figure 4). Any two objectives can be dealt with 
relatively easily but achieving all three simultaneously is extremely difficult. The financial trilemma can 
also be applied to ongoing banking supervision where the national mandate corner reflects the protection 
of depositors instead of the national resolution authority. Indeed, the problem of the financial trilemma 
boils down to sovereignty. The global financial system is integrated but the protection of global financial 




Figure 4 : The Financial Trilemma  
 
 
Source: Claessens, Herring and Schoenmaker (2010), p. 33 
 
In a nutshell, one can conclude that there are two broad forces working against timely, reliable, and 
effective  information  flows  between  supervisors  and  ultimately  against  effective  cross  border 
consolidated supervision.  
 
First,  there  are  the  information  asymmetry  problems  resulting  in  self-capture,  industry  capture  and 
political capture at the purely domestic level. These obstacles will be amplified in a cross border context 
as they will arise at the level of each domestic regulator involved in the supervisory cooperation. For 
example,  supervisory  authorities  have  the  additional  implicit  -  but  sometimes  explicit  -  objective  of 
defending and promoting their national industries (Bini Smaghi 2008). To some extent, this results in 
competition among supervisory national agencies which has the potential to affect their regulatory and 
oversight tasks. This type of competition can result in regulatory laxity, or a race to the bottom in the 
extreme case, as there is an incentive to reduce the level of regulation and the rigor of supervision to 
attract the financial industry (Dell Ariccia and Marquez 2001). In some cases, this attitude is even set in 
stone in the mandate of the prudential supervisor requiring it to contribute to or maintain the development 
of the domestic market as a financial center
11.  
 
Second,  supervisors  do  not  take  into  account  the  externalities  in  the  other  jurisdictions.  History  has 
demonstrated over and over again that this occurs at the macro level as well as at the institutional level. At  
the macro level in the early 2000s home supervisors showed little concern for the systemic effects of the 
rapid credit growth driven by their international banks on the financial stability in central and eastern 
Europe (Pistor 2010). From a home country perspective there was clearly no reason for concern; banks 
                                                           
11 For example, in Switzerland, the Federal Act of 22 June 2007 on the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (Financial 
Market Supervision Act, FINMASA) states in Article 5 that "In accordance with the financial market acts, financial market 
supervision has the objective of protecting creditors, investors, and insured persons as well as ensuring the proper functioning of 
the financial market. It thus contributes to  sustaining the reputation and competitiveness of Switzerland’s financial centre”.  
Similarly, in the United Kingdom one of the "Principles of Good Regulation" on the former Financial Services Authority Website 
stated "The international character of financial services and markets and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position 




were well diversified and the region was a major growth market. For the host country's perspective 
however, a credit bust was developing.  
 
At  an  institutional  level,  the  home  supervisor  may  not  report,  or  may  misreport  or  delay  reporting 
supervisory information to the host supervisor, resulting in issues with regard to timeliness and relevance 
of information shared in a college. The more subjective nature of the information (“soft information”) 
shared  among  supervisors,  particularly  supervisory  risk  assessments,  makes  delays  and  manipulation 
relatively easy (Holthausen & Ronde 2004). For example, a host supervisor may be inclined to inflate its 
risk assessment and require a higher capital buffer with the objective of encouraging the banking group to 
provide  additional  capital  or  resources  to  the  foreign  operations.  Likewise,  a  home  supervisor  may 
understate the risks with the objective of avoiding sudden ring-fencing decisions by the host supervisors.  
 
On top of those two broad forces, several other factors exacerbate the obstacles to effective cross border 
cooperation.  
 
  Conflicts arising from differing mandates and differing tolerance for failure 
Individual authorities have different mandates and value financial stability differently. In a less developed 
country, regulators are more attentive to financial inclusion and issue regulations that may seem rather lax 
to others. In countries with well-diversified real economies supervisory authorities may well be prepared 
to allow banks to take more risk domestically than countries where the financial sector represents a 
multiple of its GDP. Also, attitudes toward bank failures can be very different. Goldstein and Vernon 
(2011, p. 7) state that “it is common among European policymakers to see bank failures as politically 
ominous disasters to be avoided at all costs, even in the case of relatively small banks. It is also often 
asserted that the US is more tolerant towards corporate insolvency than most European cultures and that 
the  US  bankruptcy  code,  at  least  when  applied  to  nonfinancial  companies,  is  comparatively  more 
protective of corporate executives and employees than most European counterparts.” 
  Confidentiality concerns 
Supervisors can be reluctant to share information as the news may leak, causing a deposit run or a 
liquidity crisis. Indeed, not every country has sound professional secrecy laws and supervisors will want 
to ensure that the exchange of information is for the purpose of performing the supervisory task of the 
authorities or bodies receiving the information. Memoranda of understanding (MOUs) can only address 
this matter to some extent as they are non binding and non enforceable contracts that are more akin to 
statements of intent. Enria & Vesala (2003) found that MOUs do not resolve the incentive problems 
between home and host supervisors. Likewise, Holthausen & Ronde (2004) also find that they are not 
sufficient to ensure a complete flow of information between supervisors. 
 
  Legal constraints 
Some supervisors still lack the legal authority to share information with foreign counterparts or can only 
share information under certain conditions. In Poland for example, the banking law states that information 
can be shared if it “is in Poland’s national interest”
12. Similarly, many supervisors are allowed to share 
information  with  other  banking  supervisors  but  not  necessarily  with  resolution  authorities  or  other 
                                                           
12 Polish Banking Act Article 131 paragraph 3 13 
 
sectoral  supervisors  in  other  countries.  Also,  the  onward  disclosure  of  information  obtained  from  a 
banking  supervisor  is  frequently  restricted,  or  may  require  explicit  approval  from  the  authority  that 
originally  produced  it.  In  times  of  crisis, this  may  raise  numerous practical issues  for  a supervisory 
college and for the newly established Cross Border Crisis Management Groups (see section 5) 
 
  Lack of a common terminology, legal framework and prudential reporting systems 
There is no generally accepted supervisory assessment framework or a "universal" supervisory language. 
What constitutes “low risk” for one agency may well be medium or even high risk in another legal and 
regulatory environment. Differing regulatory and enforcement frameworks can equally lead to situations 
where the requirements of the home supervisor conflict with the stipulations of the host supervisor. The 
divergence in prudential reporting systems can also interfere with the timely compilation of data. 
 
  Constraints  on  the  capacity  of  supervisory  agencies  and  doubts  about  the  quality  of 
supervision 
Herring (2007) identifies two additional asymmetries that will directly impact the quality of supervision. 
The first is asymmetry in resources. Supervisory agencies differ greatly in terms of the number and 
quality  of  employees.  The  second  is  asymmetry  in  financial  or  legal  infrastructure;  for  example 
weaknesses  in  accounting  standards,  the  quality  of  external  audits  or  inefficient  or  corrupt  judicial 
procedures. Differences in supervisory architecture and governance will also lead to asymmetries between 
home and host supervisors. These factors all act as constraints on the capacity of supervisory agencies, 
and may result in doubts about the quality of supervision. It is evident that the quality of cross border 
supervision is determined by its weakest link. 
 
  Geographic risk profile of the banking group 
In  accordance  with  the  principles  of  cross  border  consolidated  supervision  by  the  home  supervisor, 
incentives to share information during supervision will also be impacted by the geographic structure of 
the banking group or asymmetries in risk exposures (Herring 2007). In particular, differing perspectives 
between the host and the home supervisor on whether the bank is systemically important in either or both 
jurisdictions and whether the foreign operations are economically significant for the banking group can 
create  conflicts  and  influence  willingness  to  share  information.  Herring  (2007)  has  detailed  these 
challenges arising from these asymmetries in the incentive structure between the host and the home 
supervisor  to  share  information  and  collaborate.  He  distinguishes  three  dimensions  linked  to  the 
geographical risk profile of the banking group: 
  Whether the parent bank is considered to be of systemic importance in the home country  
  Whether the foreign operations are of significance to the solvency of the parent bank; and 
  Whether the foreign operations are systemically important in the host country, 
The resulting conflicts are represented schematically in the table 1. The first two dimensions are listed in 
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Source: Herring (2007) p. 15 
 
From the home country perspective, the most challenging situations occur where the foreign operations 
are not regarded as systemically important by the host country but are a significant part of a systemically 
important bank in the home country (case e). From the host country perspective, cases (b) and particularly 
(d) are the most challenging. These situations arise most frequently in Africa, central and eastern Europe 
and Latin America. 
 
  The stage of supervision 
Rosengren (2007) as well as Claessens, Herring and Schoenmaker (2010) have found that incentives 
between home and host supervisors get magnified as problems get worse. Hence, divergences between 
these sets of incentives will also get magnified.  As a consequence, incentives for communication and 
cooperation will further diminish as the health of the bank deteriorates because each jurisdiction will give 
priority to addressing its own problems and will not communicate with others.  
 
The analysis developed in the next section builds on the work done by Herring (2007) but takes into 
account this time dimension as reflected in the stage of supervision.  It also analysis the conflicts in 
incentives in three scenarios: preventative supervision, deterioration in the health of the parent bank and 
deterioration in the health of the subsidiary bank.  
 
IV.  A Schematic Presentation of Supervisory Incentives for Information Sharing  
 
Consider an integrated banking group with centralized liquidity, capital and risk management where the 
subsidiary is dependent on the parent bank for capital, funding and liquidity. The banking group has a 
home and a host supervisor, which also act as agents to their respective governments. Assume that this is 
a systemically important bank in the home country. The consolidated banking group is headed by the 
parent bank and the consolidated banking group is supervised by the home supervisor. 
13 
 
                                                           
13 Annex A shows the analysis in this section in more general terms.  15 
 
Let’s assume that the incentives for the home supervisor to share information can take three possible 
forms: 
1.  “SHARE”:  openly  share  accurate  and  timely  information  on  the  health  of  the  parent  bank  and 
banking group;  
2.  “MINIMIZE AND DELAY”: minimizing and delaying genuine concerns; or 
3.  “NO INCENTIVE”: no clear and strong incentive to share information. 
 
We assume the incentives for the host supervisor to share information with the home supervisor can take 
four mutually exclusive forms:  
1.  “SHARE”: openly share accurate and timely information on the health of the subsidiary bank;  
2.  “RING-FENCE”: there is a strong incentive to ring-fence;  
3.  “OVERSTATE CONCERNS”: overstating concerns about the health of the subsidiary; or 
4.  “NO INCENTIVE”: no clear and strong incentive to share information. 
14 
Furthermore, the host supervisor  can combine ring-fencing with the sharing of accurate and timely 
information and with overstating concerns about the health of the subsidiary.  
 
1.  Analysis of the Prevention Stage 
 
Figure 5 below shows that the extent of information host supervisors receive from the home supervisor 
depends on the materiality of the foreign operations as part of the banking group. When the foreign 
operations are not material to the banking group, there is no incentive for the home supervisor to share 
information.    Figure  6  depicts  the  information  sharing  incentives  from  host  supervisors  to  home 
supervisors and shows that these are lower when the operations are not systemic in the host country.  
 
Figure 5: Prevention stage 
Incentives for the home supervisor to 
share information with the host supervisor 
 
Figure 6: Prevention stage 
Incentives for the host supervisor to share 
information with the home supervisor 
 
   





                                                           
14 The supervisory authority will still have an incentive to take action domestically, but if the operations are not systemic in the 
host country, the supervisory intensity will generally be lower and it is likely the authority will take a more balanced approach 
towards the cost of sharing information (attending colleges etc) than in the case where the operations were systemic.  16 
 
From Figure 5 and 6, the following conclusions can be drawn:  
  Home to host incentives for information sharing decrease with the materiality of the host 
operations to the group operations. 
  Host to home incentives for information sharing increase as the operations in the host country 
become more systemic.  
Putting both graphs together, the only instance where home supervisor and host supervisor have a strong 
incentive to openly share accurate and timely information is in the case a material host and systemic 
foreign operations in the host country.  
 
2.  Analysis of the Remedial Stage  
  Deteriorating Health of the Parent Bank 
When problems occur at the parent bank, home and host incentives conflict in every instance (figure 7 
and 8). The effects of a potential failure of the bank now make the home supervisor give priority to its 
local stakeholders and the national interest. Hence, the home supervisor has incentives to delay, deny and 
minimize the relevance or significance of its concerns and potential remedial actions so as to avoid ring-
fencing, particularly in the case where the foreign operations are material to the banking group. The host 
supervisor now has incentives to ring-fence. In the absence of a resolution mechanism or an ex ante 
burden-sharing  agreement,  it  is  likely  that  this  conflict  in  incentives  will  escalate  and  supervisory 
cooperation will break down.  
 
Figure 7: Problems in the parent bank:  
Incentives for the home supervisor to 
share information with the host supervisor 
Figure 8: Problems in the parent bank: 
Incentives for the host supervisor to share 
information with the home supervisor 
   
Source: Author   
From Figure 7 and 8, when the health of the parent deteriorates, the following conclusions can be drawn:  
  The home supervisor’s incentives to minimize and delay information sharing regarding his 
concerns become more important when the host operations are material to the overall banking 
group. 
  The host supervisor’s incentives to share information increase as the operations become more 
systemic in the host jurisdiction. The host supervisor now has stronger incentives to ring-fence in 
all situations. 
Putting both graphs together, there is no instance where the home supervisor and host supervisor have a 
strong incentive to openly share accurate and timely information. This finding is particularly important 




  Deteriorating Health of the Subsidiary 
In the scenario where the problems occur in a systemically important subsidiary, the host supervisor has 
an  incentive  to  overstate  concerns  to  the  home  supervisor  so  as  to  attract  attention  (and  capital  or 
liquidity). At the same time, even if problems occur in the subsidiary, the host supervisor still keeps an 
incentive to ring-fence the assets he can save. 
 
Figure 9:Problems in the subsidiary bank:  
Incentives for the home supervisor to 
share information with the host supervisor 
Figure 10: Problems in the subsidiary bank: 
Incentives for the host supervisor to share 
information with the home supervisor 
 
   
Source: Author   
From Figure 9 and 10, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
  The  home  supervisor’s incentives  decrease  with the  materiality  of  the  host  operations to  the 
banking group operations. 
  The host supervisor’s incentives to overstate problems increase as the operations in the host 
jurisdiction become more systemic (and less material to the group).  
Putting both graphs together, there are no instances where the home supervisor and host supervisor have 
strong incentives to openly share accurate and timely information.  
 
 
V.  Policy Options to Address the Incentive Problems in Cross Border Supervision 
 
It is widely recognized that the incentive conflicts between home and host supervisors cannot be easily 
resolved, particularly those emerging from the international nature of banking groups and the national 
nature of supervisory frameworks. Thus it is all the more remarkable that since the global financial crisis 
so little attention and consideration have been devoted to the development of policies to remedy the 
instances where a supervisory agency’s incentives are in outright conflict with the need to cooperate.  
 
A number of policy options to address conflicts of interest between home and host supervisors have been 
under discussion. They can broadly be divided into three non-mutually exclusive strands. The first strand 
focuses on the improvement of supervisory cooperation, mainly through the establishment and operations 
of supervisory colleges. This group of measures has broad political and supervisory support from the G20 
and the Financial Stability Board. The second strand includes ring-fencing and the subsidiarization model. 
The  third  strand, the  ideal  option, is  the  establishment  of a  framework  providing  a  binding  code of 
conduct across nations (IMF, 2009). This option is probably unachievable in the medium term.  As a 18 
 
more pragmatic intermediate option, this paper proposes a fourth strand, consisting of better oversight of 
supervisory colleges while a more long-term solution is developed. 
 
1.  Improved Cooperation through Supervisory Colleges 
One important tool for supervisors  to share supervisory information on cross border banking groups 
among supervisors consists of “supervisory colleges”.  These are groups of supervisors with the primary 
objective of exchanging information and establishing a dialogue in order to ensure that they are able to 
identify and address the main risks across a banking group. The information in supervisory colleges is 
shared  on  a  voluntary  and  confidential  basis.  Importantly,  supervisory  colleges  are  neither  decision 
making bodies nor supranational agencies. Hence the participation in a supervisory college does not limit 
a  supervisory  agency’s  regulatory  or  supervisory  powers,  meaning  that  any participant can still take 
unilateral action.  
 
Supervisors have formed supervisory colleges since the 1980s. A college of supervisors was in place for 
the  Bank  of  Credit  and  Commerce  International  (BCCI).  Supervisory  colleges  were  also  relatively 
widespread and active during the Basel II implementation as was recognized by the Basel Committee in 
its 2006 paper Home-Host Information Sharing for Effective Basel II Implementation
15. Nonetheless, the 
global financial crisis has brought supervisory colleges in the spotlight, particularly since the G-20 noted 
the importance of the use of colleges to enhance supervisory cooperation related to global banks
16.  The 
G-20  also  tasked  the  FSB  to  “set  guidelines  for,  and  support  the  establishment,  functioning  of,  and 
participation in, supervisory colleges, including through ongoing identification of the most systemically 
important  cross  border  firms.”
17  The  FSB  recommended  that  the  use  of  international  colleges  of 
supervisors be expanded so that a college exists for each of the largest global financial institutions. A list 
of  cross  border  financial  groups  identified  as  needing  college  arrangements  was  developed  but  not 
published by the FSB
18. Since the crisis, very good progress has been made as core supervisory colleges 
have been in operation since 2009 for the more than 30 large complex financial institutions identified by 
the FSB as needing college arrangements.  
 
In response to the G-20 request for guidelines and support of the functioning of supervisory colleges, the 
Basel Committee released a paper on “Good Practice Principles on Supervisory Colleges” in October 
2010
19. The proposed good practice principles are designed to help both home and host supervisors ensure 
that supervisory colleges work as effectively as possible by outlining expectations in relation to college 
objectives, governance, communication and information sharing.  
                                                           
15 Basel Committee (2006a) 
19 At the November 2008 Washington D.C. summit, the G-20 noted the importance of the use of supervisory colleges to enhance 
supervisory cooperation in its communiqué. In March 2009, the G-20 emphasized the use of supervisory colleges again in the 
London  communiqué.  At  the  2009  Pittsburgh  summit,  the  G-20  noted  the  substantial  progress  achieved  in  establishing 
supervisory colleges and reinforcing cooperation among supervisors.  
17 G-20 Declaration, Strengthening the Financial System London Summit 1 (April 2,2009)  
18 The Financial Times however published such as list in November 2009. The following institutions  were mentioned: Goldman 
Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, Royal Bank of Canada, HSBC, Barclays, 
Standard Chartered, UBS, Credit Suisse, Societe Generale, BNP Paribas, Santander, BBVA, Mizuho, Sumitomo, Mitsui, 
Nomura, Mitsubishi UFJ, Unicredit, Banca Intesa, Deutsche Bank and ING.  In July 2011 the Basel Committee published the 
consultative  document  “Global  systemically  important  banks:  Assessment  methodology  and  additional  loss  absorbency 
requirement” 
19 Basel Committee (2010a) 19 
 
As outlined in this paper and in accordance with the supervisory task-sharing, the home supervisor is 
responsible  for  designing  the  structure,  membership  and  operational  arrangements  of  a  supervisory 
college. Supervisory colleges are generally aligned with the risk profile and geographic penetration of the 
supervised  institution.  A  wide  variety  in  college  structures  has  emerged.  Many  colleges  have  tiered 
structures consisting of a core college containing a limited number of supervisors, a regional college and a 
general college containing a wider range of host supervisors. Alternative structures also exist, including a 
separate college by business line (for example, for the trading book or internet banking). Some colleges 
have also established working groups to focus on specific issues, such as liquidity management across the 
banking group. There is broad consensus among supervisors that the flexibility in the design of college 
structures and their composition (“variable geometric approach”) is essential and that it would not be 
appropriate to prescribe specific college structures. 
The home supervisor also decides on the frequency and modalities of the meetings, sets the agenda and 
chairs the meetings. The home supervisor has ample discretion in these administrative decisions as there 
are no formal legal, accountability, conflict or appeal arrangements governing international supervisory 
colleges. The decisions by the home supervisor can affect the effectiveness of supervision by the host 
supervisor, as well as of supervisors not represented on the college. Should a host supervisor not be 
comfortable with the actions of (or the absence of actions by) the home supervisor, it could respond by 
bilateral or multilateral negotiation with the home supervisor or, ultimately, by the more extensive use of 
host country powers, for example by ring-fencing.  
The  home  supervisor  must  also  asses  the  legal  ability  of  each  participating  supervisor  to  share 
information, as well as the assurance that the information remains confidential. These concerns have up to 
now  been  addressed  by  formal  confidentiality  arrangements  such  those  contained  in  MOUs  among 
college  members.  These  are,  however,  not  legal  documents  but  statements  of  intent,  which  are  not 
enforceable in court.  
In October 2010, the FSB issued a paper “Reducing the Moral Hazard Posed by Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions” (FSB 2010c).  The paper includes a requirement that for each globally systemic 
financial  institution  (G-SIFI),  there  should  be  an  institution-specific  cooperation  agreement  between 
relevant home and host authorities, to be negotiated within Cross Border Crisis Management Groups 
(CMGs). These agreements should provide for clarity as regards the roles and responsibilities of home 
and host authorities in planning for and managing the resolution of the institution. Further they should be 
underpinned by national law that provides both the mandate and the capacity to co-operate and share all 
relevant  information  among  home  and  host  supervisors,  central  banks  and  resolution  authorities 
(paragraph 16).  The CMGs would consist of all relevant central banks and resolution authorities as well 
as the authorities represented on the core supervisory college. The FSB also requires that all financial 
institutions be resolvable in an orderly manner and without solvency support from tax payers. Hence, 
recovery and resolution plans that assess the resolvability of the G-SIFI should be mandatory and a 
continuing exercise (paragraph 17). 
 
The Basel Committee’s good practice paper on supervisory colleges states that “supervisory colleges and 
crisis  management  groups  are  distinct  but  complementary  (p.13).”  Principle  7  includes  the 
recommendation for the work of the banking group’s supervisory college to serve as one of the building 
blocks for crisis management planning.  20 
 
The composition and practices of supervisory colleges are confidential. However, the Basel Committee’s 
good practice paper states that the home supervisor should periodically notify host supervisors and the 
Basel Committee of the structure of the college and relevant participants. It remains unclear what  is 
actually the objective of the notification to the Basel Committee. Over the summer of 2009, the Basel 
Committee  performed  a  survey  on  college  arrangements  and  practices  in  the  banking  sector.  The 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) undertook a similar exercise in the insurance 
sector. Unlike the IAIS, the survey results for the banking sector were not published but formed the basis 
for the Basel Committee s good practices paper. 
Box 2: Supervisory Colleges in the European Union 
EU banks operate in a more closely integrated political and legal framework, and the extent of financial 
market integration and cross border banking is more developed than in the rest of the world. The state of 
affairs of supervisory colleges, and cross border supervision in general, in the EU is thus fundamentally 
different.  
 
The EU also has a legally binding framework for home host cooperation among supervisors. This legal 
framework is implemented by a set of principles, guidelines and written agreements allowing common 
sharing and delegation of tasks, common risk assessments and conflict resolution processes. It includes 
exchange  of  information,  cooperation  in  emerging  situations  and  even  some  joint  decision  making. 
Indeed, Article 129 (3) of the revised Capital Requirements Directive requires that the consolidating  
supervisor (generally the home supervisor) and supervisors of subsidiaries involved in the supervision of 
a cross-border banking group do everything within their power to reach a joint decision on the application 
of  the  Pillar  2  provisions  related  to  the  Internal  Capital  Adequacy  Assessment  Process  and  to  the 
Supervisory  Review  and  Evaluation  Process.  The  joint  decision  should  cover  the  adequacy  of  the 
consolidated level of own funds held by the banking group with respect to its financial situation and risk 
profile, as well as the required level of own funds above the regulatory minimum, applied to each entity 
within the group. These tasks should be carried out within each college of supervisors established in 
accordance  with  the  CRD  and  operating  under  the  framework  developed  by  the  European  Banking 
Authority (EBA).  
 
Despite these arrangements being in place during the global financial crisis, in some instances national 
supervisors have still struggled to coordinate actions. An example is the case of Fortis
1.  In other cases, 
such  as  Dexia,  joint  solutions  were  reached.  In  the  wake  of  the  financial  crisis,  the  EBA,  and  its 
predecessor agency the Committee  of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), have taken a pioneering 
role in promoting and enhancing cooperation by establishing good practice guidelines on the operational 
functioning  of  colleges.  CEBS  has  strengthened  its  guidelines  for  the  operational  functioning  of 
colleges and issued guidelines for the joint risk assessment and joint decision on the risk based capital 
adequacy. Also, EBA observers attend the meetings of supervisory colleges. In accordance with article 
131a of the amended Capital Requirements Directive, all EEA cross border banking groups should now 
have a college of supervisors in place. In October 2010, CEBS published a detailed peer review. About 17 
supervisory  colleges  were  reviewed.  Although  much  work  is  still  to  be  done,  the  results  were 
encouraging. 
1 The Benelux governments initially provided capital injections to their respective local Fortis banks. When this failed to calm the 




The Basel Committee (2010) recommends that colleges “should facilitate effective crisis management by 
assisting in planning the crisis management meeting, encourage the banking group to produce appropriate 
information for crisis management and serving as a conduit for information sharing (p.13)”.  
 
A closer look at stages of banking supervision will help to better understand the complexity of the inter-
linkages between supervisory colleges and Cross Border Crisis Management Groups (CMGs). Claessens  
Herring and Schoenmaker (2010) describe the three typical stages of banking supervision: prevention, 
remedial  and  resolution.  The  first  or  preventative  stage  consists  of  licensing  procedures,  ongoing 
supervision, such as inspections and off-site analysis, and taking disciplinary actions when required. In 
this stage, policy is developed and supervision is performed to address emerging risks. In the remedial 
stage,  supervisors  take  actions  in  response  to  the  problems  that  have  emerged.  This  can  include, 
improving risk management processes, removing managers and/or placing restrictions on activities or 
dividends.  In the resolution stage, supervisory authorities deal with serious weaknesses and act in concert 
with central banks, the Ministry of Finance, resolution authorities and bankruptcy courts, if applicable. 
The instruments range from private sector solutions such as a takeover of a weak bank by another bank, 
restructuring and bankruptcy) to public sector solutions such as government provision of capital, lender of 
last resort facilities, nationalization).  
 
Table 2: Stages of Supervision and the Role of Supervisory Colleges  
 
Stage of supervision 
  Prevention  Remedial  Resolution 








Private sector resolution 
Bankruptcy/restructuring 
Public sector resolution 
 










Source: author based on Claessens, Herring and Schoenmaker (2010) p. 34 
 
In reality, these three stages are more of a continuum and each prudential supervisor in a college will of 
course  have  its  own  definition  and  interpretation.    Generally  speaking,  banking  supervisors  through 
supervisory  colleges  would  play  the  leading  role  in  the  first  and  the  second  stage,  but  have  a 
complementary and more supportive role in crisis management situations. 
 
Claessens Herring and Schoenmaker (2010) correctly state that the tools in each stage are interrelated and 
should be considered collectively. So, the incentives to intervene early using the remedial measures will 
be driven by the perception of financial resources at risk from failing to take proper action (p.35). A 
similar view is expressed by the IMF (2010) when stating that “the existence of an effective resolution 22 
 
framework will likely enhance supervision and reduce the risk of “regulatory forbearance” by giving 
national authorities credible resolution options” (p. 6).  
 
It is not clear if, and how, these inter-linkages between the stages of supervision and resolution are taken 
into  account  in  the  current  policy  debate  which  appears  to  either  focus  on  crisis  management  and 
resolution regimes or on good practices for supervisory colleges. The recommendations produced do not 
yet provide workable and integrated solutions for real day-to-day supervision, where institutions' risk 
profile  and  business  models  evolve  and  supervision  approaches  vary  between  remedial  action  and 
prevention over time.  
 
The Basel Committee’s good practice paper
  provides valuable implementation guidance, particularly in 
the areas of information sharing, collaborative work and communication channels. It does not develop 
practices or policies to systematically mediate the fundamental  underlying conflicts identified  above, 
however.  Although  it  touches  upon  crisis  management  groups,  the  good  practice  paper  does  not 
distinguish between the preventive and the remedial stage in supervision.  With regard to the membership 
and structure of supervisory colleges, it is encouraging that the paper does identify the possible conflict of 
interest between the home supervisor and the host supervisor where the foreign operations are systemic to 
the host jurisdiction but not material to the banking group. It recommends the inclusion of such host 
supervisors in the colleges, but leaves it up to the home supervisor to decide if the inclusion is in the core 
or  general  college.  Host  supervisors  will  most likely  question if  this  recommendation  should  not  be 
stronger.  
 
The vast amount of work done by the FSB and the Basel Committee in the area of cross border resolution 
and supervision should not blind one to the rather limited potential of supervisory colleges to effectively 
achieve their objectives. At the very best, they can only be seen as a “limited, incomplete response to the 
inadequate coordination of supervision of global financial institutions” (Alford, 2010, p.4-5). As long as 
national supervisors
20 are not given the mandate to take into account global financial stability concerns (or 
at least financial stability in other countries ) and no internationally agreed resolution or burden -sharing 
mechanism exists, supervisory cooperation cannot be fully effective. An example of a broader mandate 













                                                           
20 The responsibility for domestic financial stability may also not lie with the supervisor but with the central bank. In some 
countries it is even not clear who is accountable for domestic financial stability. 23 
 
 
Box 3:  Australia and New Zealand Enhanced Mandate for Financial Stability 
 
The New Zealand and Australian banking systems are amongst the most closely integrated in the world. 
Around  85  per  cent  of  New  Zealand  banking  system  assets  is  Australian-owned,  and  New  Zealand 
banking assets comprise around 15 per cent of total assets of Australian-owned banks. This high degree of 
trans-Tasman banking integration creates significant areas of common and overlapping interest between 
the Australian and New Zealand authorities. These interests are similar, as both countries seek to have 
sound  and  efficient  financial  systems  that  contribute  fully  to  the  performance  of  their  economies. 
Moreover, the regulatory approaches in Australia and New Zealand are quite complementary and well-
aligned. However, both countries worked on legal amendments and practical arrangements to address 
situations where national interests diverge. In particular, if a large bank got problems in one country or 
the other, there might be some differences of view as to how the authorities should respond, and who 
would be expected to bear the consequences.  
 
In February 2005, the Australian Treasurer and the New Zealand Finance Minister established a Trans-
Tasman Council on Banking Supervision as a major step towards the development of a single Trans-
Tasman economic market in banking services. The Council is chaired jointly by the Secretaries to the 
Treasuries  of  Australia  and  New  Zealand  and  also  comprises  senior  officials  from  the  Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA), the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand  (RBNZ).  The  Council’s  aims  are  to  enhance  cooperation  and  information  sharing  between 
respective supervisors on the supervision of Trans-Tasman banks; promote and regularly review Trans-
Tasman  crisis  response  preparedness  relating  to  events  that  involve  banks  that  are  common  to  both 
countries; and guide the development of policy advice to both governments. The Council has initiated 
legislative changes in Australia and New Zealand required to ensure APRA and the RBNZ support each 
other in the performance of their current regulatory responsibilities at least regulatory cost. 
 
The key elements of the legislative changes in both countries implemented are as follows: 
· a general provision requiring each regulator to support the other in fulfilling its statutory objectives and, 
wherever reasonably possible, to avoid actions that could have a detrimental effect on financial system 
stability in the other country; 
·  a specific  reference in the  definition  of  `actions  likely  to  have  a  detrimental  effect  to  actions  that 
interfere with or prevent the provision of outsourced services to a related party in the other country; 
· a requirement that, where reasonably practicable, the regulators consult each other before exercising a 
power that is likely to have a detrimental effect on financial system stability in the other country; and 
· a requirement that an administrator or statutory manager in Australia advise APRA if the administrator 
or statutory manager has reasonable cause to believe that the proposed exercise of a function or power by 
the administrator or statutory manager is likely to have a detrimental effect on financial stability in New 
Zealand. 
 
2.  Ring-fencing and Subsidiarization  
 
  Ring-fencing 
The  basic  objective  of ring-fencing  is to  protect the  domestic  assets so that  they  can  be  seized and 
liquidated under local law in case of failure of the parent. In this way, ring-fencing can help protect the 
banking system and depositors in the host country. Ring-fencing can take various forms, can occur at 
various stages of the supervision process and can be applied at the level of the individual institution and 
of the larger banking system.  24 
 
In reality, practices vary widely across the spectrum with some jurisdictions imposing asset pledges or 
asset  maintenance  requirements  so  as  to  assure  that  sufficient  assets  are  available  for  the  local 
stakeholders in the event of failure of a bank. Supervisors may also require specific “firewalls” between 
the bank and the other entities of the banking group. Under this practice the bank is isolated from other 
entities in the group by taking several actions, including (i) prohibiting or placing limits on the financial 
exposure of a bank towards other entities of the banking group; (ii) limiting the funding the bank receives 
from other banking group entities; and (iii) ensuring that the directors and management of the bank can 
operate the bank independently from the management of the group (Song, 2004)
 21.  
 
There are several arguments against ring-fencing. First, ring-fencing measures taken by authorities in one 
country could increase stress on the banking group's legal entities in other jurisdictions or for the banking 
group as a whole. This is particularly true for sudden ring-fencing decisions during the remedial stage or 
during a crisis. In the theoretical case that a fully centralized liquidity model is used, it is essential that 
funds can flow seamlessly across jurisdictions to the various entities of the group. If these liquidity flows 
abruptly cease to operate in distress, the situation will quickly snowball, becoming a solvency issue.  
 
Second, ring-fencing decisions need to be carefully balanced with the impact on the economy and credit 
supply in the host country as it could undermine access to capital markets for emerging countries and the 
expansion of international trade more globally.  
 
Third,  ring-fencing  increases  the  cost  on  the  banking  group.  Cerrutti  and  others  (2010)  prepared  a 
simulation  of  the  capital  needs  of  25  large  European  banking  groups  resulting  from  a  credit  shock 
affecting  their  subsidiaries  in  the  region.  They  demonstrate  that  these  groups  would  need  to  have 
substantially higher capital buffers at the parent and/or subsidiary level if they face a risk of being unable 
to transfer capital and/or profits across borders. The costs borne by private banks cannot be considered in 
isolation  but  must  be  assessed  against  the  cost  of  financial  crises,  of  which  the  tax  payer  bears  a 
substantial part. 
 
  Subsidiarization 
Under the subsidiarization scheme, international banks are required to convert their foreign branches and 
business lines into autonomous, stand-alone subsidiaries subject to the regulation and supervision of each 
host country. Under its most extreme form, authorities will not only require that operations by foreign 
banks be conducted through standalone subsidiaries but also that intra-group transfers or other operational 
group dependencies (such as IT, outsourcing and back office functions) are eliminated. This model is 
sometimes also referred to as the Stand Alone Subsidiary model (SAS).  Under this solution, each host 
jurisdiction would ensure that each banking subsidiary in its country is structured such that it can operate 
independently and is fully self sufficient. For example, it would have to be able to stand alone in the areas 
of capital, liquidity, operations and risk management.  From the perspective of the host supervisor, this 
protects the local banking system from negative spillovers from the rest of the group. It would also allow 
resolution of problem parts of the group with minimal disruption. Although subsidiaries can in theory 
operate  independently,  indirect  contagion  risk  arising  from  reputation  risk  cannot  that  easily  be 
eliminated. 
                                                           
21 For example, Australia requires that a bank’s assets in Australia must be equal to or greater than the total amount of its deposit 
liabilities in Australia. 25 
 
There is a general understanding in the literature that incentive problems in cross border supervision are 
less  prominent  for  subsidiaries,  as  they  are  independent  legal  entities  under  the  control  of  the  host 
supervisor (Mayes & Vesaya 1998; Schueler, 2003). Thus, when allowing significant foreign banking 
operations to operate in their country, some host supervisors require that they do so as subsidiaries.
22 
While the legal distinction between branches and subsidiaries remains  very important for resolution,  it 
may  well  have become  a more  academic discussion for supervision   purposes.  Indeed, from  a host 
supervisory perspective, the  independent subsidiary view is increasingly undermined by the growing 
integration and centralization of key management functions, li ke liquidity and funding, compliance and 
auditing and internal controls (Schoenmaker and Oosterloo, 2005). Likewise, common practices such the 
issuance of    group-wide  guarantees  and cross-guarantees,  the  raising  of  equity  through entities in 
“cheaper” jurisdictions and the onward direction of these funds to the jurisdictions where they generate a 
higher return further blur the legal distinction between subsidiaries and branches (Fiechter and others 
2011).  
Cross border banks are now generally organized along business lines, irrespective of whether they are 
branches or subsidiaries, leading to operational structures that are very different from legal structures. 
This trend has made it very hard for banks and banking supervisors alike to allocate activities to legal 
entities, which still form the basis for supervisory and regulatory task-sharing. Also, under the Basel II 
framework, significant capital reductions can be achieved by applying the advanced capital calculation 
approaches and this has spurred banks to organize their risk management functions more centrally. As a 
result of this increased integration of functions in banking groups, host supervisors sometimes have to  
rely on supervisory work and complex judgments of home supervisors, without having the means to 
investigate and assess the  supervisory  framework or the drivers leading to these judgments.  For this 
reason, many practical challenges remain and subsidiarization cannot be seen as a short to medium term 
panacea for host supervisors.  
 
The impact of these centralized key functions within a banking group was raised by the Basel Committee 
in 2003 when it suggested that where “mind and management” are centralized in a banking group, “the 
host country supervisor may choose to rely entirely on approval work conducted by the home country 
supervisor” (paragraph 16, p.7) so as to avoid overlaps in supervision, preserve authorities’ supervisory 
resources  and  reduce  implementation  burdens  for  cross-border  banks.  It  is  questionable  how  host 
supervisors could justify this proposed "supervisory outsourcing" approach to their respective domestic 
principals, particularly in view of the lack of incentives for the home supervisor to take into account the 
cross border externalities. For host supervisors, the fundamental point of opposition is that responsibility 
and  decision  making  become  separated.  Indeed,  the  final  responsibility  for  supervising  foreign 
subsidiaries remains with the host supervisor and the host country tax payer still has to pick up the bill if 
things go wrong.  
 
In summary, as long as the incentive distortions between home and host supervisors remain unaddressed, 
carefully designed and timed ring-fencing or subsidiarization remain  options for most host supervisors. 
Ring-fencing and subsidiarization  have the additional advantage that, in case the foreign operations are 
                                                           
27 For example , Brazil, Mexico and New Zealand require or strongly encourage local subsidiaries. Brazil also has regulations to 
prevent subsidiaries from returning earnings to the parent bank. In Argentina, Bolivia, India and the Republic of Korea, branches 
are subject to capital and liquidity requirements similar to local subsidiaries. Albania has established a “systemic” threshold 
above which the regulation of subsidiaries apply to branches. 26 
 
material to the group, home supervisors may be inclined to step up information sharing or address host 
concerns in order to avoid escalating ring-fencing actions by the host supervisor. Nevertheless, unilateral 
host regulatory and supervisory action requires strong and independent supervisors, with the capacity to 
make robust, balanced and timely assessments. The frequently observed lack of independence, lack of 
data and the widespread human capacity constraints in lower- and middle-income host countries make 
strong host regulatory and supervisory responses unlikely.  
 
3.  Binding Code of Conduct or Regulation 
 
The 2009 IMF report “Initial Lessons of the Crisis” proposes the establishment of a framework providing 
a binding code of conduct across nations (IMF, 2009). “One part would be an international charter for 
banks  that  operate  across  borders,  establishing  the  procedures  for  joint  risk  assessment  by  various 
supervisors, remedial actions and burden-sharing. Another would be for home and host supervisors to 
agree on these issues and for the colleges to become the arbiters in enforcing understandings (e.g., burden 
sharing of losses in proportion to a bank’s exposure in each jurisdiction)” (p. 10) 
 
Although in principle, a binding code of conduct appears to be the ideal solution, broad international 
agreement on such a code appears very unlikely at this stage. Also, it would be essential that a code be 
enforceable. That said, this approach should not be ruled out in a regional or bank-specific context. 
 
Pistor (2010) has also analyzed effect-based regulation as a valid addition to the home country control 
principle.  Generally  speaking,  effect-based  regulation  gives  host  countries  the  option  to  exercise 
regulatory jurisdiction, whether or not the entity is domiciled within their jurisdiction, in the event that 
their financial or economic system might be inadvertently affected by a financial intermediary’s actions. 
The  scope  of  Pistor’s  work  is  much  broader  than  supervisory  cooperation  between  home  and  host 
supervisors as described in this paper. It is also geared towards banking regulation in the EU. At a global 
level and broadly speaking, however, effect-based regulation is already in place to some extent in the 
current supervisory task-sharing arrangements. Indeed, host jurisdictions have the legal ability, and do use 
that legal ability, to impose additional regulation on bank subsidiaries, branches and other legal entities. 
Some services may be offered in the host country without a physical presence, but these issues are outside 
the scope of this paper. 
 
4.  A Fundamental Analysis of the Supervisory Cross Border Arrangements and an Intermediate 
Solution 
 
As a starting point, it is better to create a framework that secures the right incentives than to try to control 
behavior arising from the distortions in incentives. Ultimately, more fundamental improvements in the 
institutional and legal setting in the spirit of a binding code of conduct described above are needed. This 
is  a  complicated  and long  term  exercise  that  is  made  even  more  difficult  by  that fact that  financial 
regulation needs proactive ex ante solutions, in contrast to other sovereign cooperation problems  (Pistor 
2010). In this respect, it would be in everyone's interest that the current supervisory task-sharing be 
fundamentally analyzed and re-assessed, using the principles of mechanism design
23, to assess if, and 
                                                           
23  Mechanism  design  or  reverse  game  theory  is  a  field  in  game  theory  studying  solution  concepts  for  a  class  of  private 
information games.  In layman’s terms, mechanism design deals with situations where a planner has to reach a decision when the 27 
 
where, improvements can be made. This initiative could take the form of a new Basel “Concordat” or a 
new framework for home and host cooperation. It should consist of carrot and  stick approach to align 
home-host  information  sharing  incentives  and,  importantly,  harmonize  resolution  with  proactive 
supervision (Claessens, Herring and Shoenmaker 2010).  
 
In the meantime, for each supervisory college, a pragmatic and voluntary oversight mechanism could be 
established, especially addressing those particular scenarios where the incentive misalignments are the 
most significant. The observation that many home supervisors simultaneously act as host supervisors 
makes a voluntary agreement to cooperate under the auspices of an oversight body more achievable. This 
framework  would  represent  a  significant  step  forward  and  would  be  evidenced  by  a  non-binding 
understanding  among  participating  supervisory  authorities.  Inspiration  for the building  blocks  of this 
framework can be found when reviewing the EU operational guidelines for supervisory colleges. 
 
Ideally the proposed framework could comprise the following elements: 
  Oversight of the operations of supervisory colleges by an international body, such as the Basel 
Committee  or  the  Financial  Stability  Board,  including  a  mediation  and  conflict  resolution 
framework. In particular, the home and/or the host supervisor should inform the oversight body in 
case  of  difficulties  related  to  the  conclusion  of  written  agreements,  the  determination  of 
significant entities, or the membership or structure issues. Furthermore, the agenda and general 
outcome of the college activities should be made available to the oversight body in its capacity as 
an observer to college meetings; 
  No decision making authority with the oversight body, but a recommendation of good practice; 
  Attendance of all meetings by an observer of the international oversight body who should also 
regularly liaise with host supervisors individually; 
  Full disclosure of the composition and operations of supervisory colleges to the oversight body, 
including the information shared so that it can be assessed if this is adequate; 
  Surveys on at least an annual basis on the effectiveness of the operation of the college among 
home and host supervisors administered by the oversight body; 
  Peer reviews and thematic reviews on the adherence to the best practice and disclosure of the high 
level results; 
  Clarification  and  alignment  of  the  interactions  between  supervisory  colleges  and  crisis 
management groups; 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
The global financial crisis has demonstrated significant gaps in cooperation among banking supervisors. 
As  a  primary  mechanism  to  strengthen  supervisory  cooperation,  the  G-20  has  advocated  the  use  of 
supervisory colleges. Supervisory colleges were active well before and during the global financial crisis, 
but almost no analysis of their role and operations during the crisis can be found. Despite this, colleges 
have now been established and are operational for each globally systemic financial institution.  Good 
practice principles governing their operations have also been released. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
quality of the decision relies on information spread among a number of people.  The idea main idea is that any solution should 
take into account the incentives of self-interested agents, i.e., the people on whose information the decision relies must find it in 
their interest to reveal that information. 28 
 
 
Supervisory  colleges  operate  within  supervisory  arrangements  for  effective  cross  border  supervision, 
formalized in Core Principle 24 and 25 of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. 
These principles promulgate a leading role for the home supervisor in the supervision of a banking group. 
From  the  perspective  of  the  host  supervisor,  several  gaps  in  the  current  supervisory  and  regulatory 
framework  can  be  observed.  These  include  the  absence  of  an  effective  resolution  mechanism,  a 
supervisory  task-sharing  that  favors  home  supervisors,  conflicting  incentives  for  information  sharing 
between home and host supervisors, lack of oversight and enforcement in case effective supervisory 
cooperation does not take place as well as the absence of mediation or conflict resolution mechanisms. 
 
This paper used the principal-agent framework to explain incentive conflicts in banking supervision in 
both a single country and a multiple country setting. Two broad forces work against timely, reliable and 
effective  information-sharing  between  supervisors  and  ultimately  against  effective  cross  border 
supervision. First, there are information asymmetry problems resulting in self-capture, industry capture 
and political capture at the purely domestic levels which are amplified in a cross border context. Second, 
supervisors do not take into account externalities in other jurisdictions. In addition to these two forces, 
many other factors worsen the obstacles to effective cross border supervision,  such as differences in 
mandates and tolerance for failure, confidentiality concerns, legal constraints, constraints on the capacity 
of  supervisory  agencies,  doubts  about  the  quality  of  supervision,  the  geographic  risk  profile  of  the 
banking  group,  the  stage  of  supervision  and  lack  of  a  common  terminology,  legal  framework  and 
prudential reporting systems. 
 
Incentives for home-host information sharing were analyzed using a simple example of a systemically 
important  banking  group  with  centralized  liquidity,  capital  and  risk  management  functions.  In  the 
preventative stage of supervision, there are only a limited number of instances where both home and host 
supervisors  have  strong  incentives  to  share  information.  As  the  health  of  the  parent  deteriorates, 
incentives  for  information  sharing  conflict  and  the  home  supervisor  has  the  incentive  to  delay  and 
minimize the seriousness of his concerns. The effects can be systemically important and devastating for 
host supervisors, particularly if the foreign presence is significant in their jurisdiction. In the opposite 
scenario, as the health of the subsidiary deteriorates, the host supervisor has the incentive to overstate 
concerns, especially if the foreign operations are systemic in the host country. The lack of agreed upon 
resolution and burden-sharing mechanisms means that, as prudential concerns arise, the domestic mandate 
of the supervisor becomes predominant. It is therefore crucial that policy makers do not divorce the crisis 
management  and  resolution  policy  debate  from  the  discussion  on  good  supervisory  practices  for 
supervisory  colleges.  Crisis  management,  resolution  and  proactive  supervision  should  be  part  of  an 
integrated and streamlined approach adopted by supervisory colleges and crisis management groups. 
 
Three broad strands of policy options to address the identified incentive conflicts are put forward in the 
literature. The first strand focuses on improved supervisory cooperation, mainly through the formation of 
supervisory colleges. The second strand includes ring-fencing and subsidiarization options.  The third 
strand advocates the establishment of a framework providing a binding code of conduct across nations.  
 
Policy makers should be aware that incentive conflicts cannot be addressed by better cooperation alone.  
What is needed is a rigorous analysis and review of the supervisory task-sharing framework so that it 29 
 
ensures the right incentives at every stage of the supervision process. The supervisory task-sharing should 
be tailored to ensure that incentive distortions are addressed. Prudential supervisors of cross border banks 
must work closely together in a partnership towards the common objective of effective supervision of the 
banking group. Thus, a fundamental analysis and assessment of the supervisory arrangements using the 
principles of mechanism design should be explored. Obviously this is a complex and long term exercise.  
 
In the meantime, a pragmatic solution would be the introduction of an oversight role of the operations of 
supervisory  colleges  to  be  conducted  by  an  international  oversight  body.  This  is  a  second  best  and 
intermediate solution but would represent a significant step forward in the prevention of supervisory 
cooperation failures. 
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Annex A: A Descriptive Conceptual Model Describing the Incentives for Home and Host 
Supervisors to Share Information 
  
Consider an integrated banking group with centralized liquidity, capital and risk management where the 
subsidiary is dependent on the parent bank for capital, funding and liquidity. The banking group has a 
home and a host supervisor, which also act as agents to their respective governments. Assume that this is 
a systemically important bank in the home country. The consolidated banking group is headed by the 
parent bank and the consolidated banking group is supervised by the home supervisor. The model is 
descriptive in that it does not solve for the equilibrium behaviors. 
 
1.  The Home Supervisor, Host Supervisor and Geographic Risk Profile of the Banking Group 
The supervision of the banking group involves the home supervisor and a host supervisor. 
Home supervisor = Supervisor A or SA 
Host supervisor = Supervisor I or Si 
Consider total assets of the banking group or A where ωi is the proportion of the assets located in the host 
jurisdiction i. 
So that:  ωi = 
  
    , and A =Σ ωiA with ωi, A > 0. 
Assume T is the threshold, set by the home supervisor and measured in asset value, at which level the 
foreign operations become material for the banking group.  
Hence, when Ai ≥T, ; the operations in host country i are material for the banking group. 
When Ai<T,; the operations in host country i are not material to the banking group.  
 
The systemic risk of the banking group’s foreign operations in the host country, indicated by SRi, is 
measured by the size of the financial system compared to the assets of the banking group in the host 
country. 
Fi  = Size of the financial system in the host country 
Thus, SRi = 
   
    , with  SRi = {significant, not significant} 
 
Assume the health of the banking group, denoted by Θ, is approximated by the nature of supervisory 
actions namely: prevention and remedial or Θ = {θprev, θ rem}.  
Assume  the  health  of  the  subsidiary  in  the  host  jurisdictions  Θi=  {θi_prev,  θi_rem}  with  Θ=  f(ωi,Θi).  
However, as the banking group is integrated Θi is also dependent on the overall health of the banking 
group or Θi = f(Θ).  
 
2.  Supervisory Cooperation 
Si relies on SA to receive the information required to determine Θi. 
SA relies on Si to determine Θ.  
However, when Ai < T, the information on Θi becomes irrelevant to SA, as the operations in jurisdiction i 
are too small to influence Θ.  
 
Host information sharing 
Si has four individual possible actions denoted by {Iθi, Ri, OCΘi DN}: 
1.  Openly share accurate and timely information on Θi or Iθi  31 
 
2.  Ring-fence, or  Ri  
3.  Overstate concerns about Θi, or OCΘi 
4.  do nothing or DN
24 
Si can also combine ring-fencing with the sharing of accurate and timely information and with 
overstating concerns about Θi.  
 
Home information sharing 
SA has three individual actions denoted by { IΘ, MDΘ, DN}; 
1.  Openly share accurate and timely information on Θ, or IΘ  
2.  Minimize and delay genuine concerns about Θ, or MDΘ 
3.  Do nothing, or DN. 
 The incentive for SA to openly share information with Si,  or IΘ,  is directly influenced by the size of 
Ai and by Θ.  
 
Table 1:  Summary of Likely Outcomes When the Health of the Parent Bank is Deteriorating 
Incentives 
for 
  Stage I Prevention 
Θ= θprev 
Stage II – Remedial 
Θ= θrem 
SA  if Ai ≥ T  IΘ                                               
(Cell 1)  MD Θ                                                          
(Cell 8)
  
  if  Ai  <  T  but  SRi  is 
significant 
DN
                                            (Cell 2) 
 
DN                                                                
(Cell 9) 
 
  if Aii < T  DN
                                            (Cell 3)  DN                                              
(Cell 10) 
     If Ai ≥ T  If Ai< T  If Ai ≥ T  If Ai<T 
Si  SRi is significant  Iθi        
(Cell 4)  Iθi            
(Cell 6)  Ri , Iθi          
(Cell 11)  Ri    Iθi       
 (Cell 13) 
  SRi is not significant  DN      
(Cell 5)  DN        
(Cell 7)  Ri                     
(Cell 12)  Ri                   
(Cell 14) 
 Source: Author 
 
Table 2: Summary of Likely Outcomes When the Health of the Subsidiary is Deteriorating 
Incentives 
for 
  Stage I Prevention 
Θi= θprev 
Stage II – Remedial 
Θi= θrem 
     If Ai ≥ T   If Ai< T  If Ai ≥ T  If Ai<T 
Si  SRi is significant  Iθi                
(Cell 4)  Iθi
       (Cell 6)  OCθi, Ri      
(Cell 17)
   OCθi, Ri           
(Cell 15) 
  SRi is not significant  DN
            (Cell 5)  DN  
(Cell 7)  Ri                      
(Cell 18)  Ri 
                          (Cell 16)  
SA  if Ai ≥ T  IΘ                                                      
(Cell 
1) 
IΘ                                                                            
(Cell 19)
 
  if  Ai  <  T  but  SRi  is 
significant 
DN
                                                   (Cell 
2) 
DN                                  
(Cell 20) 
  if Aii < T  DN                                 
(Cell 
3) 
DN                                   
(Cell 21) 
 Source: Author 
                                                           
24 This means that the supervisor does have a lower incentive to share information. The supervisory authority may still have an 
incentive to take action domestically. 32 
 
Figure 1: Incentives for the home supervisor to 
share information with the host supervisor - 
Prevention stage 
Figure 2: Incentives for the host supervisor to 







Figure 3: Incentives for the home supervisor to 
share information with the host supervisor 
Problems in the parent bank 
 
Figure 4: Incentives for the host supervisor to 
share information with the home supervisor 







Figure 5: Incentives for the home supervisor to 
share information with the host supervisor 
Problems in the subsidiary bank 
 
Figure 6: Incentives for the host supervisor to 
share information with the home supervisor 
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